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Bayer v. Schein Pharmaceuticals – Best Mode Requirement – -In
Chemical Inventions: When Does “Carrying Out the Invention” Start?–
A Proposal for a Comprehensive Best Mode Compliance Test.
JUSTIN CHARLES WARD∗

[T]he best mode requirement is intended to ensure that a patent applicant
play ‘fair and square’ with the patent system. It is a requirement that the
quid pro quo of the patent grant be satisfied. One must not receive the
right to exclude others unless at the time of filing he has provided an
adequate disclosure of the best mode known to him of carrying out his
invention.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

A scientist at a huge pharmaceutical company develops a secret process for
making a chemical intermediate that is necessary for producing a life saving
pharmaceutical compound. As this development proceeds, the scientist files a patent
application claiming the life saving drug, but omits the information necessary for
producing the chemical intermediate according to the inexpensive and efficient method
that he has developed. The patent application discloses other, more expensive and
inefficient methods, for producing the chemical intermediate. The net result of using the
less efficient method for producing the chemical intermediate creates a higher cost to the
purchasing public for the ultimate pharmaceutical drug. Should the scientist be permitted
to withhold knowledge of cheaper and more efficient means for producing a chemical
intermediate from the public (i.e., the best mode), electing instead to disclose only a
workable embodiment (i.e., enabling disclosure)? [*120*]

In Bayer v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, the Federal Circuit held that inventors may
withhold from the public knowledge cheaper and more efficient methods for producing
an otherwise available and enabled chemical intermediate without violating the Best
Mode requirement of Section § 112 of the Patent Act2. Said differently, should a material
part of a claimed molecule be disqualified from legal status as a “limitation” of a patent
claim just because it began as a mere “chemical intermediate”?3
This paper critiques both the majority and concurrence opinion in Bayer. The
paper demonstrates that the majority's "if it doesn't affect the intrinsic characteristics" test
is flawed.4 In particular, there is scant agreement even on what is, or is not, an "intrinsic
characteristic," and thus no operational or objective standards can exist for determining
what does or does not affect such an undefined parameter. Also, the paper demonstrates
that the bright-line "scope of the claims" test advocated in the concurring opinion is
likewise substantially inoperable.5 Specifically, the "scope of the claims" concept (at
least as promulgated and applied by the Court) appears to be self-contradictory, as it
ignores the chemical reality that the claimed molecule inherently retains within itself (and
thus as its "claim element") the very reagents from which it is formed, including any
chemical intermediate. Because neither of these tests sufficiently judges the adequacy of
the best mode disclosure, this paper proposes a flexible, multi-factor test to determine
whether section § 112 has been met.6 [*121]

II. Background
A. Pioneer and generic drug companies
The plaintiff Bayer is a large international pharmaceutical company whose
business is to underwrite and conduct basic research for new drugs.7 In the industry,

Bayer is known as a “pioneer” drug company for undertaking the investment burden,
such as the basic research and development costs for a new drug, and thus would be the
initial company to bring the new drug to the market.8 Currently, the level of initial
expense to a “pioneer” in developing, patenting and marketing such a new drug may
amount to several hundred million dollars.9 This cost, per successful new drug, is further
compounded because of the necessity to pay the research costs for “dry wells” (i.e.,
candidate drugs that, when tested, do not function adequately or prove to be unsafe).10
The cost of marketing a new drug includes the widespread advertisement and adopting of
a brand name, or trademark, for the new drug.11 Moreover, the total cost, per successful
drug, extends to several other areas, perhaps less immediately evident.12 Combining all
costs, a pioneer pharmaceutical company typically incurs a total initial expense of
hundreds of millions of dollars per year -- a sum which is necessarily reflected in the
often substantial retail price paid by the consumer for the drug.13
However, the costs to a generic drug company are much less in bringing out a
second source of supply for the drug.14 For example, when a patent on the “name brand”
drug expires or is near expiration, a generic drug company can enter the market and
improve upon, or essentially copy, the name brand pharmaceutical.15 This competitive
market function can generate substantial economic and social value for the public.16
Thus, at that time a generic drug company can produce substantially the same drug –- via
the “written description” provided in the pioneer drug company’s patent – and then
market the drug at a cost to the consumer which is substantially less than that of the
brands with trademark protection.17 [*122]

Schein Pharmaceuticals and Mylan Pharmaceuticals are examples of such generic
drug companies.18 Their principal business is to produce chemical and pharmacological
equivalents of well-known drugs.19 The general mode of operation for a generic drug
company involves the filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application at or near the end
of the term of a patent covering the name brand drug developed and sold by the pioneer.20
The ANDA law allows the generic drug company to “get a head start” by filing these
proceedings with the FDA for the approval of equivalent drugs prior to the expiration of
the relevant patent, and in a proper case without liability for patent infringement.21 Thus,
the generic drug company is at a substantial advantage in the area of costs, because the
pioneer has already incurred the costs of basic research to create and screen the drug, the
advertising and promotions to create a market for the drug.22 Accordingly, the generic
drug company can make the generic equivalent available to the public at a reduced cost.23
However, some disadvantages to the public arise by reason of competition from generic
drug companies.24 In particular, the acceleration of generic drugs to the market place can
result in consumer harm by reducing the incentive for innovation from pioneers drug
companies.25
Hence, a constitutional and social policy trade-off exists, in that the pioneer has
been accorded the advantage of excluding others from making, using and selling the drug
for a period of 20 years after the patent filing. Thereafter the generic drug company has
the advantage of producing an equivalent drug at substantially reduced costs.26 The
consuming public benefits from this mechanism.27 [*123]
Because of the benefit to the public, there is scarcely an area of technology where
full disclosure of the best mode of carrying out an invention is as important to public

policy as in pharmaceuticals.28 To better understand why Bayer produces two
unworkable tests, an examination of the chemistry involved is helpful.29
B. General Chemical Principles
Many aspects of chemistry, such as chemical synthesis, are often considered by
scientists to be “more of an art than a science.”30 As one pharmaceutical company,
specializing in creating and screening new drugs has stated:

[T]his aspect of refining the structure of a lead compound, called lead
development, is still more of an art than a science. Chemistry in many
ways is still an empirical science, based on what works in the lab, but
many new techniques such as molecular modeling and formalized rules
governing structure-activity relationships (SAR) have been developed to
aid the medicinal chemist in making the appropriate choices.31
In general terms, organic chemistry involves the combining, through chemical
bonding, various atoms of the basic building blocks known as elements (such as carbon,
nitrogen, oxygen, etc.) to form a molecule.32 Thereafter, that molecule can be used either
as the final molecule of choice, or as the basis for one or a series of “chemical
intermediate(s)” in the synthesis of a yet larger molecule.33
This process of “chemical synthesis” is usually a combination of several steps,
using a reaction vessel into which the various reactants are introduced.34 The synthesis
mix is then subjected to conditions, such as temperature, pressure change, contact with
catalysts, etc.35 As indicated, the chemist may choose to make one or more sequential
“chemical intermediates” to be used for further steps in the synthesis, or alternatively, the
“intermediates” may come from another source.36 Indeed, many chemical syntheses
involve the production of such preliminary of final “intermediates.”37 In any event, the

ingredients, including any chemical intermediate molecules, are reacted together to form
the final molecule.38 [*124]
The creation of the final molecule is a series of steps that contain intermediates,
and wherein the final product cannot be brought into existence without conducting the
underlying predecessor steps.39 Hence, it necessarily follows that the “final molecule”
must inherently contain, as a material part thereof, the chemical intermediate molecules
that had been used in or had been created in the synthesis process.40 That is precisely the
situation in the Bayer case, and indeed where the 6-FQA intermediate forms the clear
majority of the final ciprofloxacin molecule.41
C.

The Bayer Chemistry
The specific facts in the Bayer case are enlightening.42

43

Ciprofloxacin has the above chemical formula, and wherein:
[A] compound of the formula or a pharmaceutically acceptable acid
addition salt or an alkali or alkaline earth metal salt thereof, in which A
represents CR3, wherein R3 denotes a halogen atom, and Z represents C-H, and R1 and R2 together with the nitrogen atom which they substitute
form a piperazino group.44

The following ingredients are reacted, in the following steps, to make ciprofloxacin: “(1)
synthesis of the Klauke compound45 (2) synthesis of 6-FQA via cycloaracyclation of the

Klauke compound46; and (3) addition of piperazine to 6-FQA to synthesize
ciprofloxacin.”47
The further pertinent facts are that the inventor, Dr. Grohe, indeed had a preferred
method for making the 6-FQA intermediate by means of the “cycloaracyclation” method,
but did not disclose this method in his patent application.48 However, Dr. Grohe [*125]
disclosed other, non-preferred methods for making the 6-FQA intermediate.49 These
non-preferred methods were conceded to be sufficient to meet minimal standards of
“enablement” under 35 U.S.C. § 112.50
D.

Pre-Existing “the invention” Best Mode Law Analyzed
From the beginning, the patent law of the United States has required that the

inventor disclose various “modes” for practicing the invention.51 In 1870, the statutory
term “several modes” was changed to the language “best mode.”52 The current statute
(the Patent Act of 1952) requires that the specification “shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”53 However, the Patent Act
(perhaps wisely) does not further define what this broad language shall mean, particularly
in terms of the scope of the terms “invention” and “carrying out” in the wide variety of
circumstances that may occur in developing technology.54
Case law explaining the best mode requirement focuses on a two-prong inquiry.55
First, the fact finder must determine whether, at the time of filing the application, the
inventor possessed a best mode for practicing the invention.56 Second, if the inventor
possessed a best mode, the fact finder must determine whether the written description
disclosed the best mode such that one reasonably skilled in the art could practice it.57
The first prong involves a subjective inquiry, focusing on the inventor's state of mind at

the time of filing.58 The second prong involves an objective inquiry, focusing on the
scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in the art.59 In dealing directly with
the second prong of the best mode requirement, the extent of information that an inventor
must disclose depends on the scope of the claimed invention.60 [*126] Accordingly, an
inventor need not disclose a mode for obtaining unclaimed subject matter unless the
subject matter is novel and essential for carrying out the best mode of the invention.61The
Federal Circuit has construed the statutory language in a wide variety of circumstances.62
The Treatises have discussed many of these varying situations.63 Most pertinent here are
Federal Circuit pronouncements regarding the definition of the statutory term “ the
invention,” and the pre-Bayer decisions on the most closely analogous circumstances.64
Initially, the Federal Circuit has uniformly held that “the invention” involved in
the best mode inquiry refers to, but is not confined to the invention expressly set forth in
the patent claims.65 However, apart from the illustrative application of this general rule
to particular fact situations, Federal Circuit decisions have not provided clear standards
for determining the circumstances under which unstated, but inherently present,
component parts of the expressly claimed “invention” and/or its expressly claimed claim
elements are to be included in the best mode requirement.66
Some Federal Circuit cases hold that only the item(s) set forth in haec verba in
the patent claim need be subject to best mode disclose.67 However, other Federal Circuit
cases hold that additional disclosure must be made as to non-claimed subject matter
which (a) either is novel, or (b) would materially affect the characteristics or functioning
of the claimed subject matter.68 [*127]

III.

Ana

A.

Bayer v. Schein
In Bayer, the plaintiff Bayer filed suit against Schein Pharmaceuticals for patent

infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2), alleging that Schein’s ANDA filing had
infringed Bayer’s ‘444 patent.69 In its defense, Schein asserted invalidity of the Bayer
‘444 patent on the antibiotic ciprofloxacin (“Cipro©”) based on a purported failure to
disclose the “best mode.”70 Specifically, Schein argued that Bayer had failed to disclose
the inventor’s preferred method for making a certain necessary chemical ingredient (i.e.,
the “intermediate” molecule (6-FQA)), even though Bayer’s application had disclosed the
preferred method of converting the intermediate into the final product, Cipro©.71 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bayer, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed on appeal.72
In focusing on the claimed invention (i.e., using a modified form of the “scope of
the claimed inventions test,” as discussed below), the Federal Circuit concluded that the
preferred method for making the chemical intermediate did not materially affect the
characteristics of the claimed molecule, and thus need not be disclosed.73 Concurring
Judge Rader in reaffirming the truly “bright-line test” used by the district court stated that
the best mode requirement “does not compel disclosure of the unclaimed method”
because the alleged best mode was an intermediate, and not the claimed invention.74
However, Judge Rader disagreed with the majority’s methodology in expanding the
statutory test for Best Mode, and reasoned that no inquiry was necessary as to whether
the non-disclosed information would materially affect the properties of the claimed
subject matter.75 In fact, Judge Rader disagreed with the majority in opining that the
withheld information in reality did materially affect the properties if the claimed

molecule.76 Instead, Judge Rader reasoned that the Best Mode test should be strictly
limited to whether the allegedly withheld information fell within the scope of the claims - if it did not, that should be the end of it.77 [*128] Therefore, Judge Rader further
reasoned, the creation of a “new test” for Best Mode involving additional inquiry into the
effect of the withheld information upon the claimed subject matter should not be
required.78
B.

The Majority opinion Threatens to Create a New Rule
The Federal Circuit’s decision in the Bayer case threatens to create a special rule

for pharmaceutical cases that is materially different from the best mode requirements
applied to patents dealing with other types of technological subject matter. Specifically,
the Bayer court proposes, without explanation, that the best mode requirement should
apply only to require the disclosure of subject matter which materially affects the
physical (or “intrinsic”) properties of the claimed subject matter, but not to other nonphysical characteristics that appear to be just as “intrinsic.”79 Further unfortunately, the
Majority opinion also does not explain the standards by which the “intrinsicness” of the
characteristics can be determined by the counseling practitioners in the profession.80
Accordingly, some scholars81 may argue that a characteristic may be “intrinsic”
for best mode purposes only if and when the Federal Circuit deems it to be – and long
after the industry has had any realistic opportunity to base business decisions upon a
reasoned legal analysis. The Due Process problems inherent in such an approach are
evident, because a rule of law should give adequate “notice to the public.”82
C.

The Majority Ignores the “Carrying Out” Statutory Language
The developed case law bears out these conclusions in criticism of the Bayer

Majority’s rule. Section 112 requires that the best mode of “carrying out” the invention
be disclosed by the inventor.83 In developing an analysis of the best mode question, and
as both the Majority and Concurring opinions point out, certain inquiries must [*129]
follow -- (a) what is the “invention” that the statute refers to; (b) what does “carrying out”
the invention mean; and (c) when in time has the “carrying out of the invention” begun to
occur?84
These inquiries are key elements in determining what must be disclosed by the
inventor in the patent regarding the synthesis of a molecule that is used by the inventor in
producing the Cipro© compound that is set forth expressly in the patent claims. The
Federal Circuit’s discussion was inherently based upon an analysis of these inquiries.
“Notwithstanding that the best mode requirement keys only on carrying out the claimed
invention, we have found violations of the best mode requirement for failure to disclose
subject matter not strictly within the bounds of the claims . . ."85 In the history of this
court and our predecessor courts, we have held claims invalid for failure to satisfy the
best mode requirement on only seven occasions. As we will see, these cases involved
either failure to disclose a preferred embodiment, or else failure to disclose a preference
that materially affected making or using the invention.”86 Whereupon, the Majority
decided that the preferred method of making and using the intermediate was exempted
from the best mode strictures of the statute. [*130]
D.

Prior Case Law Does Not Dictate the Majority’s New Rule
Moreover, the case law precedent cited by the Court in no manner requires the

new rule promulgated by the Court. For example, in the case of Application of Brebner,
the Court did not decide the best mode issue, but rather noted that the United States

Patent and Trademark Office was not equipped to make such an inquiry.87 Accordingly,
enablement was the issue there.88 Hence, the Court’s implication that the “issue” had
somehow been raised in the Brebner cases is not correct.
The Court in Bayer also cited the case of DeGeorge v. Bernier.89 The DeGeorge
case dealt with an interference count (which is analogous to a patent claim), which was
directed to electronic circuitry for use in a computer, but was not directed to the computer
itself.90 The case did not deal with a chemical intermediate, or with any other element
that was found in or subsumed into the patent claim. In contrast, in the Bayer case, the
chemical intermediate is a material part of the patent claims. Fundamentally, the atoms
comprising the intermediate do not somehow “lose” their identity just because there is a
further (and, in fact, relatively rather minor) chemical reaction which simply adds a side
chain onto the intermediate main body to form the final Cipro© molecule. In fact, such
an argumentative concept by the Bayer court flies in the face of the realities of chemical
practice and synthesis.
Specifically, the manufacture of a molecule is a series of interdependent steps that
exists as a physical reality separate and apart from any patent drafter’s decision in
describing the final product constituting the invention set forth in the patent claims.91
The case of Zygo v. Wyko is similarly instructive.92 The Zygo case dealt with a scientific
instrument known as an interferometer. The applicant had subsequently taken the usual
step of enclosing the interferometer in a box, but the box was not a part of the patent
claim. The evidence was clear that the undisclosed item (i.e., the box) was not necessary
to make a functional device. Thus, the Court held correctly that there had been not a best
mode violation by reason of failing to disclose an unnecessary element. In stark contrast,

in the Bayer case not only is the intermediate molecule “necessary” to the claimed
Cipro© molecule, but indeed the Cipro© molecule cannot exist without pre-existence of
the intermediate molecule. [*131]
In the case of USG v. National Gypsum, the patent claim was directed to a
mixture of ingredients that included expanded Perlite93. The applicant was aware that
one commercial brand of Perlite provided vastly superior qualities to the final mixture.
Thus, the Court concluded that failure to disclose this necessary element constituted a
best mode violation. Surely, it cannot be argued seriously that the chemical intermediate
is somehow not a vital part of a molecule that merely adds a side chain to the
intermediate in order to manufacture the Cipro© molecule.
Of the variety is the case of Chemcast v. Arco.

There, the inventor did not

disclose (a) the only material that he knew would function adequately, and (b) which had
even been specifically developed for purposes of use in the invention.94 This material
was a PVC polymer used in manufacturing a grommet. The patent claim there referred
both to the grommet and to the hardness of the material to be used in making the
grommet. In fact, materials of this hardness were commercially available. Hence, a best
mode violation was established. To argue that the Bayer situation is somehow different
is to fail to appreciate any distinction as to scientific fact or as to law. In fact, it could be
argued with force that the failure to disclose the preferred process in the Bayer case is far
more blameworthy, because quite clearly a withheld process cannot be reverseengineered by analyzing the commercial structural embodiment. Also, in the Bayer case,
the chemical intermediate is a material element in the patent claim, inasmuch as the
claimed Cipro© compound is merely the intermediate but with an ordinary side chain

attached by a simple, and well known, chemical reaction. [*132]
In the Randomex v. Scopus case, the patent claims covered a portable device for
cleaning compact discs. The patent claims did not incorporate any cleaning solution as
an element.95 In any event, and most importantly, the inventor there had disclosed his
preferred cleaning solution by its trade name. Thus, no best mode violation was found.
In Dana, the patent claims covered a valve stem seal for use in an internal
combustion engine.96 However, the inventor had not disclosed the fluoride surface
treatment that was required to give vastly improved functioning to the seals. Hence, and
as in the Bayer case, the preferred method of making one of the elements of the claimed
invention had been withheld, and a best mode violation was found. It is believed that
there is no reason of logic or scientific substance for treating the pharmaceutical industry
differently from the motor industry. Concealment of a preferred process is concealment
of a preferred process. Moreover, what was concealed in both cases was a material part
of the patent claim.
The Bayer court also referred to the case of In re Gay. However, the Gay case
really has very little to do with the present facts.97 There, the subject matter of the claims
was a cooking bag for cooking rice which was made of a material having a defined
porosity. The Court correctly held that it was not necessary to disclose the commercial
embodiment, particularly because the functional materials were well known. The details
of the Cipro© inventor’s secret process were (by definition) not already or independently
known to the public.
The Spectra Physics v. Coherent case is similar to the Bayer situation.98 There,
the patent claims referred to the structure of an ion laser that included copper cups and

ceramic tubes that were required to be brazed together. The inventor had failed to
disclose the particular 6-step brazing process that was preferred because of its vastly
superior properties. A clear best mode violation was found. In the Bayer case, the
inventor has failed to disclose the preferred process for making a specific molecule that is
the largest part of the patent claim. Indeed, there is absolutely no distinction between the
two cases.
Finally, the Northern Telecom case involved patent claims covering methods for
storing data, but not the audio tapes that were used for such storage.99 Nonetheless, the
Federal Circuit found a best mode violation (albeit with little analysis or details of its
reasoning).100 In summary, none of the cases cited by the Court justifies the rule adopted
by the Court.
E.

The “Claimed Invention” Rule Has Many Exceptions
As to the first inquiry (i.e., regarding the definition of the “invention” referred to

in § 112), there was no controversy in the Bayer case that the invention referred to was
the invention set forth in the patent claims. However, as analysis of prior Federal Circuit
decisions will show, this is only a general rule, and there is considerable variation in
carrying out such a rule.
The court said, [o]ur cases examining the scope of the best mode requirement
demonstrate that the best mode disclosure requirement only refers to the invention
defined by the claims.”101
However, the Federal Circuit subsequently acknowledged the exception to the
general rule that there is a legal obligation to give the full particulars of methods,
structures, or other details where the omitted subject matter would materially affect this

strictly defined “invention.” [*133]
It is this exception that the Federal Circuit has failed to apply in a
uniform or predictable fashion in the Bayer case. As Judge Rader pointed out in his
Concurring opinion, the Bayer inventor’s failure to disclose the preferred method of
making the chemical intermediate molecule does indeed materially affect the making of
the invention.102 In fact, the process used to make the intermediate forms the very
essence of the making of the Cipro© molecule, which is the claimed “invention.”
F.

The Concurring Opinion Criticizes the Majority’s Logic, But Creates Even
Greater Problems
As Judge Rader opines in his Concurring opinion, such a special rule involving

undefined “characteristics” of an invention is unworkable, unjustified in law or logic, and
further conflicts with prior decisions of the Court.103 Each of these arguments of the
Concurring opinion is dealt with below. However, none of Judge Rader’s arguments
against the errors of the Majority adequately supports the alternative approach advocated
in the Concurring opinion, and Judge Rader’s proposed rule of over-simplification is
itself materially flawed. Specifically, the Concurring opinion proposes a “bright line”
test – which concededly is easier to apply -- but which would permit the Constitutional
social contract of full disclosure to the public to be thwarted by an aggressive
pharmaceutical company.104 The undesirable social result would be that pioneer
pharmaceutical companies could maintain the higher price levels associated with patented
drugs well after their dominant patent had expired, based upon efficiencies and
advantages of concealed processes for making an intermediate.
Notwithstanding this dangerous potential for post-expiration price level
maintenance, the Concurring opinion proposes that, in pharmaceutical cases, only the

subject matter expressly set forth in the claim should be deemed to be the “invention”
referred to in the best mode requirement of the statute.105 Quite apart from its potentially
undesirable economic and social impact, such a “bright line” rule does not serve the
Constitutional purpose of the law requiring that the invention be placed fully in the public
domain at the expiration of the patent. [*134]
G.

Judge Rader’s Bright Line Test Is Not Functional
Judge Rader attempts to justify this “bright line” rule by arguing that, if the

inventor has not expressly claimed the chemical intermediate structure and/or the process
by which it is made, someone else supposedly will do so, and thus secure a “blocking
patent.” The Concurring opinion does not explain the mechanism by which the
competitor will necessarily make these ”discoveries,” and indeed this undocumented
theory of “discovery” is a rather far-fetched notion. Moreover, the withheld intermediate
structure molecule would most likely be unpatentable to such a later “discovering”
competitor. In particular, the chemical intermediate molecule, by definition, would have
been used commercially to make the final product, and thus would be an item that most
likely would have been “used or sold” in the United States for more than one year before
the discoverer’s patent filing date, thus disqualifying the intermediate chemical structure
from being a patentable invention of anyone, after such one year of use by the concealing
pioneer company.106 Moreover, such a third party would have to be a real inventor, not
merely a copyist, even to qualify as a patentee.107 Hence, the “blocking patent” argument
of the Concurring opinion on the chemical structure of the intermediate is pure
speculation, and in fact most unlikely. And most importantly, it is also highly unlikely
that there would be any detriment to the withholding pharmaceutical company by means

of any valid “blocking patent” occurring as a result of such withholding of the chemical
structure from the public.

[*135]

But in any event, it should be remembered that in Bayer it was the process of
making the intermediate that was new and greatly beneficial to the public, apparently
because of its high efficiency. The Concurring opinion does not explain how a process
that is necessarily carried out in secret will be “discovered” by the competitor. Clearly,
there is nothing about the chemical structure that teaches the skilled chemist the
important details of the process by which it was made. Hence, there is every reason to
suppose that, given the decision in the Bayer case, the factual pattern of concealment of a
secret process (which by its very nature cannot be reverse engineered) would be the
factual pattern of concealment that would be repeated in the future.108
However, Judge Rader is absolutely correct that there should be no legitimate
basis for a different rule for pharmaceutical subject matter, and indeed the creation of
such a rule cannot be supported based upon analysis of the Court’s prior case law.
Moreover, and given the public–policy purposes behind ANDA law and the litigation
based thereon, there is likewise no basis in social policy for providing special provisions
for drug companies -- whether pioneer or otherwise. The large pharmaceutical
companies should be held to the same social contract of providing a full and fair teaching
to the public in exchange for the limited right to exclude others. This is especially true
where the Federal Circuit has created a rule which in application requires at least two
major exceptions, and even then can be applied only inconsistently to the various
different technologies. [*136]
Specifically, the Federal Circuit has in essence created the convoluted rule that

the best mode requirement is to be confined to the specific subject matter of the patent
claim, except where the omitted subject matter materially affects the invention, and also
except further where the omitted information affects certain undefined “intrinsic
characteristics” of the claimed subject matter.109

IV.

PROPOSAL

There are several critically important considerations of public policy for
proposing that the Federal Circuit reconsider and modify the unworkable “bright-linebut-with- exceptions–(sometimes)-for pharmaceutical-subject-matter- only” test created
by the Bayer case. Comparing “bright line” tests with “balancing” tests may be helpful in
the process of ultimately selecting the type of test that is most appropriate under the
factual and legal circumstances present here.
Upon evaluation of all the facts and circumstances having significant impact in
chemical and/or pharmaceutical cases, it is concluded that a “balancing of the factors” or
a “rule of reason” test would form a more appropriate vehicle for analyzing and
determining whether a patentee has met the quid pro quo obligations of disclosure to the
public that accompanies the granting of a patent.
In many circumstances, a “bright line” test has considerable advantages over a
“balancing test” (i.e., a test which involves the identification) evaluation and utilization
of a multiplicity of factors. For example, lawyers in advising their clients can give more
definitive legal advice where a “bright line” test is to be used in the legal analysis. In
these circumstances, the law is deemed to be more predictable.

[*137]

In contrast, a balancing of the factors test is usually more flexible, as it can more
often successfully accommodate a wider variety of factual circumstances without

breaking down, and hence creating the necessity for the formulation of an entirely new
test. Also, balancing tests tend to be more equitable in their result, as they allow this
wide variety of differing circumstances to be taken into account.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, supra, in the Bayer case the Federal Circuit has
opted to promulgate a test which appears to be in the nature of a quasi-“bright line” test,
and thus which suffers all of the disadvantages of the “bright line” test model, but which
ultimately provides none of the countervailing advantages typically associated with
“bright line” tests. In particular, and most fundamentally, the Bayer court’s test does not
meet the seminal Constitutional purpose of providing, for the historical record, disclosure
of the full particulars of the invention to the public, in exchange for the statutory right to
exclude the public from practicing the invention for a limited time.110
As the analysis herein has shown (and as the Bayer Concurring opinion confirms),
the new test proposed and adopted by the Federal Circuit provides neither set of possible
advantages to patent lawyers and/or to the public. Specifically, the Federal Circuit has
opined that in cases involving pharmaceutical or chemical subject matter, the applicant
has no duty to disclose in the patent application the preferred method (i.e., the Best
Mode) for making the preferred intermediate compound, even though the intermediate
compound itself may be novel (as here), and even though the withheld method for
making the critical intermediate compound may be far better than any method of making
otherwise available to the public. [*138]
The Majority opinion struggles to attempt to reconcile its Bayer pronouncement
with developed Federal Circuit precedent, but ultimately cannot, as the Concurring
opinion so eloquently states. In so doing, the Federal Circuit creates the irony that its

purported “bright line” test conflicts with the very purpose for bright line tests((and often
only advantage) – i.e., predictability in the law).

As pointed out in the analysis hereof

(and moreover in the Concurring opinion), the “bright line” test argued for by the
Majority is not a fair summarization of developed Federal Circuit precedent. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has in the past accommodated a well-defined exception that itself
comprises a “balancing test” of sorts. Specifically, the Federal Circuit Majority has had
no problem in stepping back from the “bright line” where the “undisclosed subject matter
materially affected the properties of the claimed invention.”111 But then the Majority
unaccountably (but necessarily for its argument) implies that the undisclosed method of
making the intermediate somehow does not affect the properties of the final compound,
which scarcely could even be made without making the very intermediate! However, as
the Concurring opinion also points out, the Majority cannot logically apply its proposed
rule consistently with a finding of no Best Mode violation under the facts of the case.112
And perhaps even worse for the Bayer test, the Concurring opinion identifies the
contradiction of the Majority, but proposes to harmonize it by making the Majority’s
“bright line” test yet more “bright,” by eliminating any inquiry into any factor which goes
beyond the bare strictures of the patent claims, per se.
As such, the approach of the Concurring opinion becomes even more inflexible,
and most importantly, comes no closer than the Majority towards meeting the
Constitutional quid pro quo purpose of the patent grant.113 Hence, it is against this
background that a proposal for a workable solution to these problems should be made.
In order to eliminate or materially reduce the problems associated with prior Best
Mode analyses, the Federal Circuit should adopt a “rule of reason,” or balancing of the

factors test. More particularly, the Federal Circuit should expand upon, rather that to
diminish, the factual analysis begun in those cases, supra, which inquired as to whether
the concealed material had “materially affected” the operation or properties of the
invention.
The proposed “rule of reason” test advocated in this paper would permit the Best
Mode analysis to be determined under the entirety of the facts of each case as to whether
the best mode requirement has been satisfied.114 Such a “rule of reason” test would
weigh and take into account at least the following factors, in pharmaceutical or chemical
cases, as well as all other types of cases:
1. The scope of the patent claims;
2. The nature and characteristics of the final product;
3. The nature, characteristics, and novelty of the chemical intermediate
compound;
4. The various methods, disclosed and undisclosed, for making the
chemical intermediate;
5. An economic analysis of the entirety of the synthesis procedure,
particularly focusing upon the difference in cost effectiveness or quality
between the disclosed and the undisclosed methods for making the
intermediates; and
6. Any other relevant fact bearing on the conclusion on whether the
inventor has failed to teach the public fully and fairly how to implement
all aspects of his invention.
This proposed “rule of reason” test may come to be criticized, inter alia, on the
same grounds set forth in the Concurring opinion, which in turn criticized the Federal
Circuit’s prior use of non-“bright line” tests for conducting Best Mode analyses.115
Several of these anticipated objections can be disposed of now. For example, the [*139]
Concurring opinion argues that the non-bright line test of the Dana case “could sponsor a
potentially boundless inquiry into any undisclosed method or property that could affect
the satisfactory performance of the invention.”116 However, the “factual inquiry” test

developed by the Supreme Court for an obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
similarly open-ended in allowing the inclusion of any relevant factor, but has not proved
to be beyond the abilities of busy District Court judges to supervise.117 Another example
in the patent law is the rule that a patent Specification is directed to those of “ordinary
skill in the art.”118 But this, too, involves a factual inquiry involving several factors to
determine. Trial courts on a daily basis carry out “balancing” tests in a wide variety of
circumstances.119
Finally, the entire basis of equity jurisdiction is grounded upon the standard of the
“conscience of the Court” (i.e., the conscience of the King’s Chancellor sitting in equity).
It cannot be argued in good conscience that a trial court should somehow relinquish its
equity jurisdiction because too many factors might be present!
Thus, there is no reason to speculate that the District Courts somehow are not
qualified to carry out the “rule of reason” test advocated herein, and to do so with the
same relative ease and considerable success that Common Law and Equity courts have
experienced for a millennium. While the Law of Patents does present new challenges,
most of these challenges are premised on the need for laymen to understand new
technologies, rather than any inadequacies of generations-old legal principles/techniques.
Thus, the patent law does not stand alone in its need for consideration of all relevant facts
before rendering important decisions that may seriously impact upon the rights of the
entirety of the public – whether innovator or competitor.

V.

[*140]

CONCLUSION

A proper legal analysis should start with the Constitution, and then proceed to the
applicable statute(s). Thereafter, and against this fundamental background, the developed

case law should be construed and analyzed. Most definitely, the courts should take
special care in avoiding the temptation to “legislate” judicially, for example, by creating
tests or rules that (a) are not found in, or (b) conflict with, the provisions of the
Constitution or the statutory purpose. The Federal Circuit’s rule set forth in Bayer does
not reflect the Constitutional or statutory purpose, because, inter alia, the Bayer rule
would allow (or perhaps even promote) concealment of important aspects of the very res
from which the inventor has excluded the public by the patent grant -- and particularly
where, as here, the excluded subject matter is a novel chemical intermediate. For
example, the patentee would have, through the patent grant, achieved competitive
advantage and/or exclusion of the public through the doctrine of contributory
infringement.120 This arises because the intermediate would not, by definition, be a
standard commodity of commerce, but rather would be specially manufactured for
making the claimed invention constituting the final product.121
It is most fundamental that, under the Constitutional “quid pro quo” contract,
good and sufficient consideration must be given.122 Specifically, the patentee should not
be able to reap the exclusionary “benefits” of the patent grant without suffering the
“detriment” of providing a full and fair teaching to the public of the “best mode for
carrying out the invention,” under Section 112. [*141]
Contrary to the unarticulated premise of both of the Majority and the Concurring
opinions of the Federal Circuit in the Bayer case, Section 112 of the Patent Act does not
read “the best mode of the invention,” or even “the best mode of the claimed invention.”
Instead, the statute unambiguously requires that the inventor’s Best Mode of “carrying
out” the invention be disclosed. Indeed, it can be argued with considerable force that the

necessary implication of the Bayer holding is that the words “carrying out” must be read
out of the Statute. To reiterate an obvious legal truth, courts should not legislate.
Moreover, every word of the statute should be given force and effect.123
Thus, it is appropriate that scholars should consider a more comprehensive,
workable and equitable test. A “rule of reason” test, where a variety of pertinent factors
would be taken into account, would do much to reduce the capacity for mischief that is
potentially presented by the (but thinly) modified “scope of the claimed invention” test
set forth in the Bayer case. By so doing, the inventor would continue to receive a reward
that is commensurate in scope with the teaching provided to the public, and the public
would receive the full scope of the teaching and all the benefits of the invention upon
expiration of the patent. Thus, such a highly functional “rule of reason” test would meet
both the Constitutional purpose and the public policy doctrines underpinning the statute
and requiring that the Best Mode for “carrying out” the invention be disclosed to the
public.
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would turn into production specifications, which was never the intent." In re Gay, 309 F.2d at 774. Some
experimentation is necessary does not preclude enablement; the amount of experimentation, however, must
not be unduly extensive. Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1576; see also W.L. Gore & Associates,
50

Inc. v. Gaarlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 469 U.S. 851 (1984); In re
Angstad, 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
51
Act of Feb.21, 1793, ch.11, Sec.3, 1 Stat. 318.
52
Act of July 8, 1870, ch.230, Sec. 26, 16 Stat. 198.
53
Patent Act, § 112.
54
Id.
55
Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927-28.
56
Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997); U.S. Gypsum Co. v.
Natl. Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
57
Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1548; U.S. Gypsum, 74 F.3d at 1212.
58
U.S. Gypsum, 74 F.3d at 1212; Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 928.
59
Id.
60
Engel Indus. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
61
Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. United States Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
see also Roy E. Hofer, L. Ann Fitzgerald, A Review Of The Recent Decisions Of The United States Court
Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit: Article: New Rules For Old Problems: Defining The Contours Of The
Best Mode Requirement In Patent Law, 44 Am. U.L. Rev. 2309 (1995) (Discussing the recent changes in
the best mode requirement in the year 1995). This includes two of the most important pronouncements
from the Federal Circuit: 1. Chemcast, which established a two-step analytical method for evaluating best
mode compliance, and 2. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., which answered many
questions about the need to update best mode disclosure in continuing application practice. Chemcast, 913
F.2d at 928; Transco Prods., 38 F.3d at 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Donald S. Chisum, Patents 7.05[2]
n.1 (1991); In re Honn, 364 F.2d 454, 462-4 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Tofe v. Winchell, 645 F.2d 58, 65-7
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
62
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-28
63
Chisum, § 7.05 “The Best Mode Requirement”, 7-317, et seq.
64
Id. for Chisum.
65
Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 963; see also Chisum, Setion § 7.05[1][e], n.131; Chemcast, 913 F.2d at
927.
66
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Wahl Instruments, Inc.
v. Acvious Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
67
Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927; N. Telecom, Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1288
(Fed. Cir. 2000); The Bayer case deals with the disclosure requirements, if any, for the best mode of
methods for making a novel chemical intermediate upon which other standard chemical reagents are
chemically bonded to form the final Cipro© molecule, which is the express subject matter of the patent
claims. Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-28. Conceptually, it is fundamental chemistry that final molecules in a
chemical synthesis are formed by joining together smaller, precursor chemical entities. Vollhardt at 3-9,
246, 264-7, 610-14. Likewise, various different categories of inventions are similarly formed from their
constituent parts, and when set forth expressly in patent claims are frequently called “claim elements”. Id.
for Bayer. However, whether an invention’s smaller constituent parts are held together by chemical bonds
(in the case of a molecular invention), by covalent or physical mixture means (in the case of composition of
matter inventions), or by mechanical means (as in the case of a mechanical device or apparatus invention),
is not deemed to be conceptually distinct. Vollhardt at 3-9, 246, 264-7, 610-14. There is not any
discussion in the Federal Circuit cases calling forth any distinction requiring a different best mode analysis
based upon the various methods of joinder of the elements of the various kinds of chemical, composition of
matter, and/or apparatus inventions. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 963; N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1288. Nor do the
Federal Circuit decisions develop or discuss any rationale for unique best mode standards for use in
chemical cases based upon any considerations of public policy. Id. Accordingly, chemical or molecular
inventions, which are formed from smaller chemical moieties, may properly be considered to be analogous
to (a) compositions of matter, which are composed of various elements admixed together, or (b) mechanical
devices having several elements which are mechanically connected to effectuate the functioning of the
device. Id. for Vollardt. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has deemed failure to [*149] disclose relevant
information regarding such a component part of the claimed invention to be within the scope of the best
mode analysis. Id. for Bayer. However, the Federal Circuit in the Eli Lilly case and now the Bayer case

sub silentio deems the various constituent parts of a molecule (reflecting the smaller molecules from which
it is formed) to be fundamentally different from the various constituent parts of mechanical and/or
composition of matter inventions. Id. for Bayer and Eli Lilly.
68
Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partn., 860 F.2d 415 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Spectra-Physics v. Coherent Inc.,
827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 147 Fed. 1374, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 955. This judicial dichotomy is highlighted in the differing approaches of
the Majority and Concurring opinions in the Bayer case. Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-28.
69
Id.
70
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(d).
[A] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (d) the invention was first patented or
caused to be patented, or was the subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant . . .
in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the
filing of the application in the United States . . .
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-28; Steven B. Walmsley, Best Mode: A Plea To Repair Or Sacrifice This
Broken Requirement Of United States Patent Law, 9 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 125 (2002)
(Discussing the importance of the Best Mode requirements and whether the requirement should be saved
and repaired or completely abandoned).
71
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-28. The business of developing, producing and marketing chemical
intermediates has achieved an important status within the chemical industry. Id. Prominent companies in
this field include: Celanese (available at <http://www.Celanese.com> (last visited Nov. 16, 2003);
Mittsubishi Chem. Corp. (available at <http://mitsubishi-api.com>(last visited Nov. 16, 2003)); Cipro©
(ciprofloxacin hydrochloride) is an antibiotic used to treat bacterial infections in many different parts of the
body. Cipro Info page (available at <http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cipro> (last visited Nov. 16,
2003)). It does not work for viral infections (for example, the common cold). Id. Cipro© is approved for
the inhaled form of anthrax after an individual has been exposed. Id. Safety and effectiveness in pediatric
patients and adolescents less than 18 years of age have not been established, except for use in inhalational
anthrax (post-exposure). Id.
72
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1308. The court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Summary
judgment is appropriate when, based on the record, no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Id. A disputed fact is material
if it might affect the outcome of the suit such that a finding of that fact is necessary and relevant to the
proceeding. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Nobelpharma
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, (Fed. Cir. 1998); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1985); 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 343 (7th
Cir. 1995); Shearing v. Iolab Corp., 975 F.2d 1541, 1544, (Fed. Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
genuine issue exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Id.
A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit such that a finding of that fact is
necessary and relevant to the proceeding. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 962; Id. for Bayer.
73
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1323-28. The federal circuit did not discuss the details of the involved
chemistry and specifically that the chemical intermediate (6-FQA) physically and chemically constituted a
material part of the final molecule described as the patent claims. Id. Chemical Intermediates have utility
and can be patented. Id.; see also Cohen & Schwartz, Do Chemical Intermediates Have Patentable
Utility?, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 87, 89-91 (1960). Stated differently, the atoms constituting the
chemical intermediate 6-FQA could not be removed from the Cipro© molecule as described in the claims
without destroying the fundamental and beneficial characteristics of the ciprofloxacin molecule. Id. for
Bayer.
74
Id. [*150]
75
Id.

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1306-1324; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112; Compliance with best mode disclosure requirement
for patent specifications is a question of fact composed of two subsidiary factual inquiries: first, the fact
finder must determine whether, at the time of filing the application, the inventor possessed a best mode for
practicing the invention, and this prong is highly subjective and focuses on the inventor's state of mind as of
the date of filing the application, and, second, if the inventor subjectively considered one mode to be
preferred over all others, then the inquiry is whether the inventor's disclosure is adequate to enable one of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the best mode of the invention, and this inquiry is objective and depends
upon the scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in the relevant art. Id.
80
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-24. The Bayer court has held: a patent invalid for the failure to satisfy
the best mode requirement in two particular situations. Id. First, invalidated patents where the parties do
not adequately disclose a preferred embodiment of the invention. Id. As a result, if an inventor fails to
disclose the preferred embodiment of the invention, the best mode requirement is not satisfied. Id. Second,
the court has invalidated patents when the patentee failed to disclose “aspects of making or using” the
claimed invention and the undisclosed matter “materially affected the properties” of the claimed invention.
Id.
For example, in Spectra Physics and Nobelpharma, the inventors failed to disclose
subjective preferences that related to making the inventions, and the undisclosed information
“materially affected the properties” of the claimed invention. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant
Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1532. In the Dana and
Great Northern cases, the inventors failed to disclose the preferred embodiment of the claimed
inventions, and the undisclosed information “materially affected the properties” of the claimed
inventions. Dana, 860 F.2d at 415-18; N. Telecom, 908 F.2d at 940.
81
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1324-28. And perhaps future panels of the Federal Circuit, based upon the
reasoning of the Concurring opinion. Id.
82
U.S. Const. Amend. V, §1. The United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 holds;
[N]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
77

Id.; see for example, Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); Kaluzynski v. Armstrong, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11040 (D. Me. 2001); Ostergren v. Village of Oak Lawn, 125 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.E.2d 2000);
U.S. v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1991); McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1989); TransPacific Freight Conference v. Fed. Maritime Com., 209 U.S. App. 27 (2d Cir. D.C. Cir. 1980); Harper v.
Lindsay, 616 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1980).
83
35 U.S.C. § 112; The best mode requirement for disclosures in patent specification is not
satisfied if an inventor fails to disclose the preferred embodiment of the invention, or fails to disclose
aspects of making or using the claimed invention and the undisclosed matter materially affected the
properties of the claimed invention. Id.
84
Wahl, 950 F.2d at 79; see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544,
1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987.)
85
Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002); The best mode
requirement for disclosures in patent specification is not satisfied if an inventor fails to disclose the
preferred embodiment of the invention, or fails to disclose aspects of making or using the claimed invention
and the undisclosed matter materially affected the properties of the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
86
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1316. [*151]
87
In re Brebner, 455 F.2d at 1404; The Court of Pennsylvania limited the scope of the appropriate
best mode inquiries to the scope of the claims. Id.

88

Id.
DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d at 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
90
Id.;
[T]he counts concern electrical circuitry in word processors (or typewriters) designed to
obtain automatic indentation of a block or paragraph of text so that subsequent lines of
the block (or paragraph) are indented from the left line regardless of the recorded codes
for the subsequent lines. The invention, to be used with a word processor (or typewriter),
was referred to by the board as a two-counter comparison paragraph indent (TCCPI)
circuit.
89

Id.
Count 1 reads as follows:
[A]pparatus for controlling the operation of a data processing system printer
having printing mechanism for printing characters and functional mechanism for
selecting the location of printing of characters, first means for sensing a first
characteristic operation of the printer, second means enabled in response to the sensing of
said first characteristic operation for counting a first succession of second characteristic
functional operations including first storage means for storing the count of said second
characteristic functional operation, comparison circuit means for counting a second
succession of said second characteristic functional operations, and means limiting said
second succession of second characteristic functional operations when the count of said
second succession bears a pre selected relationship to the count of said first succession of
second characteristic functional operations.
Id.
91
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-28. Given the relatively simple final step in forming the Cipro©
molecule, it would be strange indeed for the patentee to argue that the entirety of the chemical process,
including the preferred method for synthesis of the intermediate, was not a material part of the “invention”.
Id. If the patentee had raised such an argument, the District Court might very well have considered the
Cipro© ”invention” to be invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Id. The Court did not discuss
this apparent inconsistency. 35 U.S.C. § 103 states:
[C]onditions for patentability;non-obvious subject matter
(a) A patent may not be obtained, though the invention is not identically disclosed, or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103.
The Patent Law, like other areas of the law, should be consistent. The “invention” for §
112 best mode purposes should be the same “invention” relied upon by the patentee for non
obviousness under § 103; 35 U.S.C. § 103, 35 U.S.C. § 112.
92
Zygo, 79 F.3d at 1563.
93
Gypsum, 440 F.2d at 510.
94
Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927. The Bayer court has purported to apply the best mode beyond the
scope of the claims: "Most of the cases in which we have said that the best mode requirement was violated
addressed situations where the inventor failed to disclose non-claimed elements that were nevertheless
necessary to practice the best mode." Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-28.
95
Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585-600 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
96
Dana, 860 F.2d at 418. [*152]
97
In re Gay, 309 F.2d at 772. The enablement requirement ensures that "that a specification shall
disclose an invention in such a manner as will enable one skilled in the art to make and utilize it." Id. The
best mode requirement is "separate and distinct" from enablement and "requires an inventor to disclose the

best mode contemplated by him, as of the time he executes the application, of carrying out the invention."
Id.
98
Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1527.
99
N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1285.
100
Id. Northern Telecom applies the claimed invention rule and eschews a "material effect on
properties" test to identify a best mode. Id.
101
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1315. Judge Rader comments on the fact that the majority has broadened
the scope of a best mode analysis without the necessary support from case law or statutory law.
[W]ith the "scope of the claimed invention" rule governing the identification of best
modes, the court claimed that it should have halted its analysis when the district court
correctly applied that rule. Up to the point of acknowledging the claimed invention, this
Bayer opinion reflects well the bulk of this court's best mode jurisprudence. Then,
inexplicably and without support in the statute or case law, this Bayer opinion widens its
best mode net to capture the properties of the claimed invention and further sweeps in
any material effect or impact on those properties.
Id. at 1306-28.
102
Id. at 1321.
103
Id. at 1324-28. A counter argument to my newly proposed balancing test is in direct support of
the concurring opinion. Id. The argument is that the district court correctly decided this “easy” Best Mode
case. Id. The court did not need to plant any new traps in the best mode minefield. Id.; see also Best
Mode Provision ‘Significantly’ Expanded in Concurring Decision, MEALEY’S LITIGATION REPORT:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Vol. 10. #22 (August 19, 2002); Prior Foreign Patents Don’t Invalidate
Cipro© Patent, ANDREWS PUBLICATION p. 3 (2002)(Discussing the impact of broadening the scope of
the best mode requirement by Judge Radar); Inventor’s Preferences Need Not Be Disclosed Absent
Material Effect on Claimed Invention, NEWS WASHINGTON, Sec. Patent/Best Mode, ISSN 0148-7965
(Aug. 16 2002)(Discussing the importance and support of Judge Radars Concurring opinion); In Bayer, the
court explained the Dana relationship test which could “potentially sponsor a boundless inquiry into any
undisclosed method or property that could affect the satisfactory performance of the invention”. Bayer,
301 F.3d at 1325; “Patent law in general is not concerned with the performance of an invention, let alone its
satisfactory performance.” Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27, at 34,42 (1921). The Bayer opinion
“incorporates Dana within its "material effects" test:
"In Dana, . . . the inventors failed to disclose subjective preferences that related to the use of the claimed
inventions, and the undisclosed information materially affected the properties of the claimed inventions."
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1319.
The Federal Circuit has continued to identify best mode situations for twenty years without a
material effect or properties test. Id.
[M]oreover, the Federal Circuit already has a claimed invention rule based on the
language of Section § 112 In expanding the best mode test to accommodate Dana, the
new Bayer test creates new conflicts with many cases in which this court found no best
mode. Thus this new material effect test contravenes much of the calculus the Federal
Circuit has employed in best mode cases.
Id.;
In Eli Lilly, the court showed the difficulty of expanding the best mode test: it seems as though the
court missed a lot of its significance. Id. “The Bayer opinion characterizes Eli Lilly as within its new rule
based on a few words in Eli Lilly that distinguish the starting material from the "intrinsic quality" of the
invention.” Id.A review of the totality of the Circuit's best mode cases, shows that this court does not use
an "effect on properties" test to identify best modes, but instead uses a scope of the claimed invention test.
Id. at 1325. The opinion fails in its effort to erect a new test that is, in any event, beyond the facts of this
case. Id. at 1325. [*153]
104
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-24. Many other courts and law review articles have criticized the use
of “bright line” tests in patent law and have encouraged a fact specific test approach. Miranda v. Ariz., 384

U.S. 436, 444 (Fed. Cir. 1966); see also Kathryn E. Crossley, Patent Law and Policy Symposium: ReEngineering Patent Law: Recent Development: Much Ado About Miranda, Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 569, 574
(2000); Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa, Evelyn Mary Aswad, Joseph S. Cianfrani, How Much Fuel To Add To
The Fire of Genius? Some Questions about Repair/Reconstruction Distinction in Patent Law, 48 Am. U.L.
Rev. 1205, 1222 (1999) (Discussing “bright line” tests).
105
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1306-24. The “scope of the claimed invention” rule; Title 35 requires
disclosure of "the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C § 112.
The most important words in this phrase are "his invention." Id. These words invoke the claims. Id.
Based on this direct statutory language, the bulk of this court's precedent states that the disclosure necessary
to satisfy the best mode requirement depends on the scope of the claimed invention.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at
1329-33; see also Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 963. The extent of information that an inventor must disclose
depends on the scope of the claimed invention. Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1324.
106
35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
107
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
108
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1319-20. In fact, in Bayer the salient chemical intermediate had been made
by two different routes, one much better than the other. Id.
109
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1322.
110
U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 8.
111
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1315.
112
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1321. This Bayer case’s bare characterization does not contend, nor could
it, that a starting material does not materially affect the properties of the invention. Id.
113
35 U.S.C. § 112. There are several aspects of the Concurring opinion, apart from its advocacy
for a simple “bright line” rule, that present cause for concern to the patent profession. Bayer, 301 F.3d at
1306-24. In particular, the precedental value of the Court’s decision is significantly undermined by the
Concurring opinion’s characterization of the Majority opinion as constituting “dicta”, and further by the
Concurring opinion’s outcome determinative approach – i.e., the district court got it exactly right. Id. at
1322. In so doing, the concurring opinion presents “no harm, no foul” reasoning. Id. at 1324-28. For
example, as justification for adopting the simplistic “scope of the claims” standard used by the District
Court, the concurring opinion cites with approval the non sequitur that there had been full disclosure of the
novel intermediate in a different application. Id. In fact, as this court’s opinion notes, the inventor fully
disclosed the intermediate, but not in this patent’s specification. Id. Instead the inventor disclosed the
intermediate in a separate (but albeit later) patent application. Id. at 1321. Then, in aggravation, the
Concurring opinion added the further irrelevancy that, “The proposed best mode in the case was so far
removed from the scope of the claimed invention that it was itself a separate invention.” Id. However, this
novel reasoning ignores the well-developed concept of sub-combination claims. Id. Hence, neither the
novelty of the intermediate, nor its disclosure in a different application does anything whatsoever to
“remove” the subject matter of the intermediate from the claimed invention. Id. Indeed, as the chemistry
itself shows, the so-called “intermediate” is a material (if not huge) part of the final Cipro© molecule. Id.
And, yet additionally, the novelty of the intermediate virtually assures that unauthorized producers of this
non-standard commodity of commerce would be subject to a suit for contributory infringement under the
‘444 patent. Id.
114
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1324-28. The concurring opinion itself recognizes the need for a definitive
test for determining best mode, but implies that the District Courts would not be adequate to determine
what is “dicta”, what rule to apply, or even how substantively to determine best mode issues, absent a very
simple (i.e., “bright line”) rule. Id. The next district judge encountering a best mode case would have to
ask several imponderable questions: What is the Federal Circuit statement of the best mode rule? Even
under this case, what is the test to identify a best mode – scope of the claimed invention, necessary
relationship to performance of the claimed invention, or material effect on the properties of the claimed
invention? What is a “property?” What is a “material effect?” How “material” is “material?” Whereupon,
the concurring opinion tellingly used the term “easy” in describing the most important characteristic of any
good best mode test. Id. The district court correctly decided this easy best mode case. Id. This court
certainly did not need to plant any new traps in the best mode minefield. Id. [*154]
115
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1324-28. Because the Bayer court does not discuss the matter, it is assumed
for purposes of this analysis that the “ease” being referred to by the Concurring opinion was intended to be

ease of application by the District Courts, rather than ease of review by the Federal Circuit. Id.
Notwithstanding the Concurring opinion’s assessment of the abilities of the District Courts, what should be
determined by whatever best mode test were to be adopted is the fundamental question: Did the public get
from the inventor what the public had “paid for” in granting a patent to the inventor? Id. If the District
Courts must determine purportedly “difficult” issues, such as the definition of a “property” or what is
“material”, or even what is “dicta”, these are the very sort of issues that the federal trial courts were
established to determine. Id. Hence, ease of application is not a genuine issue here. Id. But even so, mere
convenience to the courts would not be an appropriate substitute for accuracy, or for correctness, whether
under the Constitution, or under the Patent Statute. And the ease of an appellate court in reviewing the
decision of a trial court, or even whether such appellate review would be essentially de novo, entitled to the
presumptive correctness of a jury verdict, or some other standard, are not factors to be given any substantial
weight in determining which test should be used to determine best mode compliance; the Federal Circuit is
no stranger to the type of balancing test that is stated in this paper.
Specifically in the case of EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys. Inc., the Federal Circuit promulgates a
balancing test and names thirteen specific factors to be decided on the issue of the “on-sale” bar under 35
U.S.C. § 102. EZ Dock, Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525
U.S. 55, 142 L. Ed. 2d 261, 119 S. Ct. 304 (1998); Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d
1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Gould Inc. v. U.S., 579 F.2d 571, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F.3d 1534, 1540
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
116
Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1320-21.
117
Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (Fed. Cir. 1966). The Graham case provides a listing of
factors to be considered in determining obviousness under § 103. Id. The courts have had no substantial
problems in carrying out this multi-factored test. Id. These factors are as follows: [W]hile the ultimate
question of patent validity is one of law, A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S.147, 153-5 (1950);
the § 103 condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends itself to
several basic factual inquiries. Id. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art resolved. Id. Against this background, the obviousness or non-obviousness of the
subject matter is determined. Id. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the
origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. Id. As indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness, these
inquiries may have relevancy. Id. at 17.
118
35 U.S.C § 112.
119
Union Pacific Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Co., 236 F.3d 684 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Keystone v.
Midstates Dist. Co. Inc., 235 F.supp. 2d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2002). For example, in those frequent instances
where it is necessary for the trier of the fact to use the “reasonable person standard” in assessing the scope
of a legal duty and/or the adequacy of the performance carried out thereunder.
120
35 U.S.C. § 271 1952.
121
35 U.S.C § 271(c) states:
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non infringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer. [*155]
See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (Fed. Cir. 1964);
Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid, Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Vanier
Mfg., Inc., 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19775 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v. BlawKnox Co., 367 F.2d 744 (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1966); Natl.
Coupling Co. v. Press Seal Gasket Corp., 323 F.2d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1963); Sidel v. Uniloy Milacron,
Inc., 34 Fed. App. 683 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

122
123

Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1201.
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 55-69 (1909).

